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SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore clawbacks as a means of addressing 
problematic executive remuneration through an examination of the approaches 
adopted by the US, Australia, and certain European Union (EU) member states and 
to highlight the lessons that South Africa may draw from the experiences of these 
jurisdictions. The article first considers the intentions and assumptions of 
remuneration reforms which have introduced clawbacks in these international 
jurisdictions. It then moves on to provide an overview of the US, Australian and EU 
clawback reforms, identifying and analysing the potential benefits and shortcomings 
of the regulatory reforms in each jurisdiction. The article asserts that the absence of a 
requirement for the clawback of incentive-based remuneration in South Africa is not 
in the interests of companies and their stakeholders since shareholders will have to 
institute often protracted and costly legal proceedings in order to recover erroneously 
awarded incentives. The article then makes recommendations on how remuneration 
clawbacks could be effectively incorporated into the South African regulatory 
framework. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Excessive executive remuneration and perverse incentives continue to fuel 
debate amongst various company stakeholders in several jurisdictions. 
Corporate scandals and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 raised 
widespread concern that inappropriate remuneration practices created 
unacceptable risk-taking in the financial institutions and incentivised the 
executives to focus on short-term gains instead of taking a long-term view. 
The developments underscored the need for effective regulatory 
interventions in order to restore confidence in the market, to ensure that the 
interests of company management are properly aligned with the long-term 
interests of the company and to discourage the rewarding of excessive risk-
taking.
1
 
                                                          
1
 Romano and Bhagat “Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the 
Long-term” 2009 26(2) Yale Journal on Regulation 359 350–360. See also Murphy 
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    In an attempt to curb problematic remuneration arrangements post the 
corporate scandals, certain international jurisdictions have introduced a 
variety of regulatory mechanisms, including subjecting the remuneration paid 
to certain directors and executives to a potential clawback.
2
 Performance-
based incentives such as bonuses and share option schemes often 
constitute a substantial component of executive remuneration.
3
 The payment 
or vesting of these incentives is subject to the fulfilment of certain 
predetermined and measurable performance metrics.
4
 The mismeasurement 
of the performance metrics will clearly result in executives receiving 
erroneous incentives that are disproportionate to performance. This 
phenomenon is commonly referred to as “excess”, “unearned”, or “overpaid” 
remuneration.
5
 The corporate scandals have further highlighted that 
executives may potentially falsify the performance metrics in order to boost 
their performance-based incentives.
6
 
    Clawbacks allow companies to recoup excess or overpaid remuneration 
that has been erroneously awarded to directors and senior executives in 
certain circumstances. These policies are recommended in most EU 
jurisdictions, including the UK, and are mandated by legislation in the USA 
and the Netherlands. The Australian Federal Government has proposed to 
amend the Corporations Act 2001 in order to provide for an executive 
remuneration clawback. Notably, the South African regulatory framework in 
relation to the director and executive remuneration does not provide for 
remuneration clawbacks. However, South Africa’s remuneration practice – 
as is the case with Australia – follows the UK and US practice with its strong 
emphasis on the payment of bonuses and the use of share-based 
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incentives.
7
 Furthermore, in South Africa, where the issues relating to 
director and executive remuneration
8
 have not yet been resolved,
9
 very little 
attention has been paid to the issue of incorporating remuneration 
clawbacks in the current regulatory framework.
10
 
    The purpose of this article is to explore clawbacks as a means of 
addressing problematic executive remuneration. This is done by an 
examination of the approaches adopted by the USA, Australia and certain 
European Union (EU) member states, and by highlighting the lessons that 
South Africa may draw from the experiences in these jurisdictions. The 
article will first consider the intentions and assumptions of remuneration 
reform which have introduced clawbacks in these foreign jurisdictions. It will 
then move on to provide an overview of the US, Australian and EU clawback 
reforms, identifying and analysing the potential benefits and shortcomings of 
the regulatory reforms in each jurisdiction. Finally, the article offers 
recommendations on how remuneration clawbacks could be effectively 
incorporated into the South African regulatory framework. 
 
2 POLICY  ISSUES 
 
One of the underlying policy justifications for remuneration clawbacks is that 
they can contribute to transparency and efficiency in the market through 
discouraging excessive risk-taking and short-termism.
11
 Inappropriate focus 
on the short-term objectives such as excessive risk-taking in pursuit of short-
term targets and incentives may potentially be detrimental to the long-term 
interests of the company and its stakeholders.
12
 Clawbacks are therefore 
designed to deter executives from pursuing inappropriate strategies that 
                                                          
7
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would enable them to benefit from short-term increases in the company’s 
value, but which could potentially undermine the sustainability of the 
company in the long-term. In this way, clawbacks help focus the attention of 
directors and executives on managing the companies in the long-term 
interests of the shareholders. They serve, consequently, as a risk 
management tool. 
    Clawbacks may also contribute to transparency and efficiency in the 
market by discouraging the manipulation of data by executives in order to 
increase their bonuses.
13
 There are a number of examples of executives 
who have overstated their companies’ financial results by large amounts in 
order to boost their bonuses and gains from the sale of their shares.
14
 
Clawbacks may therefore serve as a preventative measure to discourage 
greedy executives from deliberately inflating and manipulating earnings and 
other performance criteria for self-serving ends.
15
 
    Clawbacks are designed to allow companies to recover overpaid 
remuneration that has been erroneously paid to the executives.
16
 As such, 
clawbacks play an important role in preventing the unfair diversion of funds 
from the company and its stakeholders to overpaid remuneration.
17
 Overpaid 
remuneration may further impose substantial costs on companies and other 
stakeholders.
18
 Overpaid remuneration is also undeserved and, as such, 
undermines pay-performance sensitivity. The orthodox purpose of 
performance-based remuneration is to motivate executives to work hard and 
to create long-term value for the company and its stakeholders. Allowing 
executives to retain unearned remuneration in the form of overpaid 
incentives defeats this primary purpose of incentive-based remuneration. 
Therefore, clawbacks can play a role in aligning executive incentives with 
actual performance and long-term sustainability of the company.
19
 
    Arguments advanced against remuneration clawbacks include that they 
may have the undesirable effect of reducing the use of incentive pay – 
particularly where such policies are mandated by legislation.
20
 It has been 
                                                          
13
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14
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19
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20
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http://www.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/C9BCA81BC4914B6584B5B6D22B11E90A.
ashx (accessed 2016-10-03) 9; Cohen, Dey and Lys “The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: 
Implications for Compensation Structure and Risk-taking Incentives of CEOs” 2004 
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asserted that increased risk of liability may discourage entrepreneurship and 
may lead to increased risk-aversion in the executives.
21
 This, it has been 
argued, may be costly to companies and shareholders as it reduces 
incentives to create value.
22
 It has also been contended that clawbacks may 
make it difficult for companies to attract, retain and properly incentivise 
skilled directors and executives.
23
 
    It is, however, submitted that there are cogent policy considerations in 
favour of remuneration clawbacks as discussed above. Robust clawback 
policies would arguably enhance the company’s value in the long-term 
through encouraging sound risk management, accountability and 
responsible management of companies, as well as the prevention of the 
diversion of corporate funds. In my view, it would serve the interests of 
South Africa if carefully considered clawback policies were to be 
incorporated into the country’s regulatory framework. This would be in line 
with section 7 of the Companies Act of 2008 that lists encouraging 
transparency and high standards of corporate governance together with 
encouraging efficient and responsible management of companies as some 
of the aims of this Act.
24
 
 
3 CLAWBACKS  IN  THE  USA 
 
In the USA, the clawback of performance-based incentives is provided for in 
three federal statutes: the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002;
25
 the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008;
26
 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
27
 These statutes were 
enacted amidst widespread concerns about problematic remuneration 
arrangements and perverse incentives in the USA. This part will examine the 
relevant provisions of these statutes. 
 
3 1 The  SOX 
 
The US regulatory authorities responded to the accounting scandals, frauds 
and corporate governance failures in large companies such as Enron, 
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WorldCom and Global Crossing by passing the SOX.
28
 The clawback 
provisions in SOX are found in section 304. In terms of section 304(a), if a 
company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to its 
material non-compliance, as a result of misconduct with any financial 
reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) of the company must reimburse the 
company for: (1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based 
compensation received by that person from the company during the twelve-
month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) – whichever occurs first – of the financial 
document giving rise to the required restatement, and (2) any profits realised 
from the sale of securities of the company during that 12-month period. 
Section 304(b) affords the SEC the discretion to exempt any person from the 
application of subsection (a), as it deems necessary and appropriate. 
    Notably, the liability of the CEO and CFO is up to the full amount of the 
bonus or other incentives and profits realised from stock sales during the 
specified period. When compared with the equivalent provision in Dodd-
Frank – which provides for the recovery of incentive-based compensation in 
excess of what would have been awarded had the financial statement been 
correct
29
 – section 304(a) of SOX has potentially very harsh and punitive 
consequences.
30
 In addition to facilitating ex post facto recovery by the 
company of erroneously paid incentives, the provision was clearly designed 
to be an effective deterrence to corporate misconduct which could result in 
financial restatements.
31
 
    However, the efficacy of the clawback provisions in SOX in fostering good 
remuneration practices is not without concerns. For example, it was 
contended in the USA that companies adapted to section 304 of SOX by 
increasing the portion of the executives’ remuneration which was not subject 
to a potential clawback – for example, fixed-salary – while decreasing 
performance-based incentives which were subject to a potential clawback in 
order to minimise the high risk involved.
32
 This had the unintended effect of 
undermining pay for performance and its attendant benefits.
33
 
    Section 304 of SOX is also widely criticised on the ground that the 
circumstances in which this provision may be invoked are severely limited. 
The obligation of the CEO and CFO to reimburse the company is triggered 
by accounting restatements only in cases where there has been sufficiently 
serious misconduct by the company.
34
 Therefore, in order to rely on section 
                                                          
28
 The SOX contained far-reaching provisions aimed at strengthening corporate governance 
and accurate financial reporting in public companies. 
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 See s 954 of Dodd-Frank, as discussed below.  
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 Fried and Shilon 2011 36(4) The Journal of Corporation Law 730. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. See also Romano and Bhagat 2009 26(2) Yale Journal on Regulation 366; Bainbridge 
2011 95 Minnesota LR 1807. 
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 See SEC v Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074–77 (D Ariz. 2010). The court further stated 
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sufficiently serious to result in material non-compliance with a financial reporting 
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304, the SEC must prove a sufficiently serious misconduct. This could lead 
to unnecessary and expensive litigation.
35
 It has also been pointed out that 
overpaid incentives do not always occur as a result of misconduct by the 
company.
36
 Furthermore, ooverpaid incentives – even if they are not the 
result of misconduct – can still impose substantial costs on companies and 
other stakeholders.
37
 It is also worth noting that financial misstatements, 
whether as a result of misconduct or unintentional error, may be sufficiently 
extensive to influence the decision making of investors and other 
stakeholders.
38
 It has, accordingly, been observed that in practice section 
304 of SOX has not been effective in addressing the problem of overpaid 
incentives based on the requirement of an act of misconduct.
39
 
    Furthermore, the range of individuals from whom performance-based 
incentives may be recouped under section 304 is very restricted as the 
liability to reimburse the company applies only to the CEO and CFO. Limiting 
the application of a clawback to these two executives excludes other officers 
who also occupy influential roles in the management of the company and in 
the preparation of financial statements. It is also not clear from the wording 
of section 304 whether the clawback would apply to former executives as 
well. 
    The other weakness of section 304 is that it can only be invoked by the 
SEC.
40
 Neither the company nor the shareholders have the loci standi to sue 
the CEO and CFO for recovery of the overstated incentives under section 
304. This is problematic. It has been observed that clawback litigation may 
be protracted and very costly to the SEC.
41
 This may deter the SEC from 
actively pursuing clawbacks under SOX provisions.
42
 
 
3 2 The  EESA 
 
The clawback provisions of the EESA apply only to financial institutions 
receiving financial assistance under the Treasury Department’s Troubled 
Asset Relief Programme (TARP), which are yet to repay the Treasury 
Department.
43
 In 2009, Congress amended the EESA to introduce 
restrictions on the salaries and bonuses of the executives of these 
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institutions.
44
 This followed outrage about the “Wall Street bonus culture” 
which was widely believed to have contributed to the excessive risk-taking 
that fuelled the global financial crisis and the massive bonuses paid by 
troubled financial institutions to their executives after receiving government 
funding under the TARP.
45
 Section 111(b)(3)(B) of the EESA
46
 empowers 
the Secretary to require that the financial institution receiving assistance 
under the TARP meet appropriate standards for executive compensation 
and corporate governance. The standards required under this subsection 
include a provision for the recovery by the financial institution of any bonus 
or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on 
statements of earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later proven to have 
been materially inaccurate. 
    There are notable differences between the clawback provisions of SOX 
and EESA. The clawback under the EESA is triggered by statements of 
earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later proven materially inaccurate 
whereas SOX clawback is triggered by an accounting restatement due to the 
company’s non-compliance, as a result of misconduct, with any financial 
reporting requirement under the securities laws. A financial restatement 
under securities laws is not a requirement under EESA. Secondly, 
misconduct on the part of the company is not required to trigger the recovery 
or clawback under the EESA. Whereas the SOX clawback may be invoked 
only against the CEO and CFO of the company, the EESA clawback may be 
invoked against a senior executive officer.
47
 
    The EESA does not provide for a time period during which the recovery 
will operate whereas only incentive compensation received within the twelve-
month period following the first public issuance or filing of the misleading 
financial statement may be recouped under SOX. Furthermore, the EESA 
clawback may be invoked by the company. This is an improvement when 
compared to the SOX clawback provision that may only be invoked by the 
SEC. 
    The similarity with SOX is that the recovery or clawback under the EESA 
is of any bonus or incentive compensation paid. A “senior executive officer” 
may thus be held liable up to the full amount of the bonus or incentive 
compensation. 
 
3 3 Dodd-Frank 
 
Public concerns over the Wall Street bonus culture and the role that 
excessive executive incentives were believed to have played in contributing 
to the financial crisis resulted in the adoption of Dodd-Frank in July 2010. 
                                                          
44
 These restrictions were introduced by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(hereinafter “ARRA”) of 2009. 
45
 See Romano and Bhagat 2009 26(2) Yale Journal on Regulation 360. 
46
 Inserted by s 7001 of ARRA. 
47
 The term “senior executive officer” for the purposes of this provision is defined to mean an 
individual who is one of the top 5 highly paid executives of a public company, whose 
compensation is required to be disclosed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and any regulations issued thereunder, and non-public company counterparts. 
DIRECTOR AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION CLAWBACKS… 53 
 
 
Section 954 of Dodd-Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
48
 
by inserting a new section 10D that provides for the recovery of erroneously 
awarded compensation.
49
 Section 10D requires the SEC to direct, by rule, 
the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to 
prohibit the listing of any security of a company that does not comply with 
the requirement of disclosure, inter alia, of its policy on the recovery of 
erroneously awarded compensation. In terms of section 10D(b)(2) the policy 
on the recovery of erroneously awarded compensation must provide as 
follows: 
 
“[T]hat, in the event that the issuer is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to the material non-compliance of the issuer with any 
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the issuer will 
recover from any current or former executive officer of the issuer who received 
incentive-based compensation (including stock options awarded as 
compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the date on which the 
issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the 
erroneous data, in excess of what would have been paid to the executive 
officer under the accounting restatement.” (author’s own emphasis). 
 
    In contrast to SOX, section 10D of the SEC Act has broadened and 
refined the circumstances in which clawback of excess performance-based 
compensation will apply. Section 10D applies to any current and former 
executive officer of the company and not only to the current CEO and CFO. 
However, the provision has not defined “executive officer” in relation to the 
clawback. 
    It is also worth noting that section 10D does not require misconduct to 
trigger the clawback. The clawback applies to excess incentive-based 
compensation awarded during the three-year period preceding the date of 
the accounting restatement. The company is required to recover the 
overpaid incentives. The amount that must be clawed back is the incentive-
based compensation in excess of what would have been paid to the 
executive officer absent the material non-compliance with the financial 
reporting requirements.
50
 
    Moreover, the clawback in section 10D applies to all listed companies. 
Further, a clawback policy under this section must require the company to 
recover excess or overpaid incentive-based compensation. The statute does 
not give the company the discretion not to effect the clawback. It has been 
asserted, in support of this approach, that giving the company the discretion 
to consider whether or not to effect the clawback could undermine the 
desirable deterrent effects associated with requiring recovery of overpaid 
incentive-based compensation.
51
 
    The overall effect of section 10D is that the disclosure and policy 
requirement should apply in a very broad manner to all listed companies. It 
                                                          
48
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50
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has, however, been asserted that although section 10D of the SEC Act is a 
remarkable improvement from section 304 of SOX and would likely improve 
remuneration arrangements in public companies, there are notable 
weaknesses even with its improved provisions. For instance, the clawback in 
section 10D is triggered only by financial restatements resulting from a 
company’s material non-compliance with financial reporting requirements. 
This has been criticised for limiting the circumstances in which overpaid 
remuneration can be recovered since executives could receive excess 
incentive-based remuneration even if a restatement is not required.
52
 It has 
thus been suggested that companies should be allowed to recover overpaid 
remuneration regardless of whether or not a restatement is required.
53
 In 
addition, focusing solely on financial metrics would restrict the operation of 
the clawback since companies may use non-financial metrics and other 
circumstances to determine incentive-based remuneration.
54
 
 
3 4 SEC  proposed  rules  on  clawbacks 
 
On 1 July 2015, the SEC proposed a new Securities Exchange Act Rule 
10D–1
55
 to implement the clawback provisions of section 10D of the SEC 
Act, discussed above, directing US securities exchanges and associations to 
establish listing standards that would require all listed companies to adopt 
policies requiring executive officers to pay back erroneously awarded 
incentive-based compensation.
56
 Under Rule 10D–1 a company would be 
subject to delisting if it does not adopt a clawback policy as required, or if it 
does not disclose the policy or comply with the policy’s recovery provisions. 
 
3 4 1 Companies  subject  to  proposed  Rule  10D–1 
 
Rule 10–D applies generally to all listed companies, including emerging 
growth companies, smaller reporting companies, foreign private companies 
and controlled companies. In the opinion of the SEC, the policy reasons for 
clawing back overpaid incentive-based compensation, discussed above, 
apply to all listed companies regardless of type or size.
57
 This approach may 
possibly be criticised on the premise that the category of companies or 
issuers to which the clawback applies is too wide. It has, for example, been 
argued that private companies should be exempted from Rule 10–D as, 
unlike in large public companies, significant conflicts of interests and agency 
problems between shareholders and directors do not arise in the context of 
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(Proposed Rule) 17 CFR PARTS 229, 240, 249 and 274 [Release Nos. 33–9861; 34–
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proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf (accessed 2016-10-03). See also Federal Register / Vol. 80, 
No. 134 / Tuesday, July 14, 2015 / Proposed Rules (July 2015) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/FR-2015-07-14/pdf/2015-16613.pdf (accessed 2016-10-04). 
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private companies.
58
 While this argument may be to an extent sound, sight 
should not be lost of the fact that there exist private companies in the 
modern day corporate world that are significantly large and that have a clear 
separation of ownership and management. 
    Having considered the relative burden of compliance on all listed 
companies, the SEC concluded that even relatively small companies, their 
shareholders and the market would benefit from the clawback requirement.
59
 
Notably, the SEC has proposed to exempt certain categories of companies 
from the application of the clawback. For example, registered investment 
management companies that have not awarded incentive-based 
compensation to any of their executive officers would be excluded from the 
application of Rule 10–D. It has also been proposed that UITs
60
 would also 
be exempted from the rule. These exemptions make sense as incentive-
based remuneration does not apply to these categories of companies. 
 
3 4 2 The  trigger  of  the  clawback 
 
The clawback in section 10D of the SEC Act is triggered when the company 
is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to material non-
compliance with any financial reporting requirement under the securities 
laws. Accordingly, Rule 10D–1 proposes that the clawback will be triggered 
in the event that the company is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to a material error that affects a financial reporting measure 
based on which executive officers received incentive-based compensation.
61
 
What constitutes “material” error will depend on the facts and circumstances 
of each case.
62
 
    No misconduct or wrongdoing on the part of the company or executive 
officer is required to trigger the clawback under the proposed Rule 10D–1. 
The role of the executive in preparing the financial statement is also 
immaterial in determining whether the clawback applies. It is submitted that 
the absence of the requirement for misconduct or wrongdoing on the part of 
the company or individual concerned makes sense since, as discussed 
above; overpaid remuneration may occur regardless of whether there was 
misconduct or wrongdoing.
63
 It, therefore, follows that the clawback in 
section 10D of the SEC Act and Rule 10D–1 is regarded as an equitable 
remedy against unjust enrichment, which needs not be triggered by 
misconduct. 
 
                                                          
58
 See eg, Fried “Comments on Proposed Rule: Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously 
Awarded Compensation [Release Nos. 33–9861, 34–75342, IC–31702; File No. S7-12-15] 
(2016)” (2016) available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-15/s71215-68.pdf 
(accessed 2016-10-04) 38–39. 
59
 SEC Release https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf 12. 
60
 Ie, pooled investment entities without a board of directors, corporate officers, or an 
investment adviser to render investment advice. 
61
 In terms of Rule 10D–1(c)(1) an accounting restatement refers to a required revision of 
previously issued financial statements to reflect the correction of one or more errors that are 
material to those financial statements. 
62
 SEC Release https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf 25. 
63
 See par 3 1 above. 
56 OBITER 2018 
 
 
3 4 3 The  category  of  individuals  to  whom  Rule  10D–1 
would  apply 
 
The clawback in section 10D of the SEC Act applies to any current or former 
“executive officer” of the company. According to Rule 10D–1 “executive 
officer” would include the company’s president, principal financial officer, 
principal accounting officer, any vice president in charge of a principal 
business unit, division or function, any other officer who performs a policy-
making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making 
functions for the company.
64
 Executive officers of the company’s holding 
company or subsidiaries would be deemed to be “executive officers” of the 
company if they perform a policy-making function for the company.
65
 This 
would include officers with a significant role in financial reporting. 
    It has been contended that Rule 10D–1 is undesirable as a deterrence to 
financial misreporting in so far as it applies to a too wide category of 
individuals, particularly in large listed companies, including the less 
influential individuals when it comes to financial reporting.
66
 This, it has been 
argued, may lead to an unnecessary compliance burden.
67
 It is, however, 
submitted that in addition to serving as deterrence to financial misreporting, 
Rule 10D–1 should be viewed as a remedy against the unjust enrichment of 
company executives that may also be costly to the company. Viewed in that 
light, there is nothing wrong with extending the application of the clawback to 
executive officers of the company. The challenges surrounding the 
practicality of extending the clawback to “less senior” executive officers, in 
my view, may be remedied by giving the board of directors a degree of 
discretion whether to seek recovery of erroneously awarded incentives. 
Such directorial discretion should, however, be subject to necessary 
safeguards such as appropriate disclosure requirements and the 
requirement that the board must genuinely believe that seeking recovery 
would not be in the best interests of the company. This will help prevent 
abuse. 
 
3 4 4 Types  of  incentive-based  compensation  that  is 
subject  to  Rule  10D–1 
 
The incentive-based compensation that would be subject to the clawback 
provisions of Rule 10D–1 is defined widely to mean any compensation that 
is granted, earned or vested based wholly or in part upon the attainment of 
any financial reporting measure.
68
 Accordingly, incentives based on non-
financial metrics like operational, event-based, or strategic goals would not 
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be subject to the clawback policy under Rule 10D–1.
69
 Furthermore, 
compensation that is not based on satisfying a financial reporting measure, 
such as base salaries or incentives awarded upon completion of a specified 
employment period and discretionary bonuses, would not be subject to the 
clawback.
70
 
 
3 4 5 Determination  of  the  recoverable  amount 
 
The clawback would apply to any incentive-based compensation paid to the 
executive officers in excess of what otherwise would have been received 
had it been determined based on the accounting restatement.
71
 Under Rule 
10D–1 the recoverable amount is to be determined by the company by way 
of mathematical recalculation based on the information in an accounting 
restatement. It would, therefore, be relatively easy to determine overpaid 
incentives based on an accounting restatement. However, the determination 
of incentive-based compensation based on share price or total shareholder 
return would be quite problematic. Rule 10D–1(b)(1)(iii)(A) suggests that in 
such a case the recoverable amount may be determined based on a 
reasonable estimate of the impact of the accounting restatement on the 
performance measure.
72
 Although this approach is intended to mitigate the 
potential complexities and costs which may be involved in establishing the 
relationship between an accounting error and the share price,
73
 it would 
unlikely lead to an accurate determination of overpaid incentives received as 
a result of the financial misreporting. 
    Notably, the recoverable amount would be determined without regard to 
any taxes paid by the executive officer, as the SEC believes that such 
recovery on a pre-tax basis would be in line with the policy underpinning the 
Dodd-Frank clawback – it would ensure that the company recovers the full 
amount of the erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation. It would 
also relieve the company of the administrative complexities associated with 
calculating the recoverable amount based on the specific tax circumstances 
of each executive officer. It is submitted that this aspect of Rule 10D–1 is 
quite problematic as it is unduly punitive on the executive officers. The tax 
implications of the clawback should, therefore, be carefully considered and 
addressed in the Dodd-Frank clawback. 
 
3 4 6 The  time  period  over  which  the  clawback  should be 
applied 
 
The proposed Rule 10D–1 provides that the clawback would apply to any 
incentive-based compensation received within the three fiscal years 
preceding the date on which a company is required to prepare an accounting 
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restatement.
74
 The clawback would apply to excess incentive-based 
compensation received by a person who was an executive officer of the 
company at any time during the performance period for that incentive-based 
compensation.
75
 
 
3 4 7 Board discretion regarding the application of the 
clawback 
 
Under Rule 10D–1 the company is obliged to clawback erroneously awarded 
incentive-based compensation from its executive officers in compliance with 
its clawback policy except where it would be impracticable to do so because 
the costs of pursuing the clawback would exceed the recoverable amount or 
where the recovery would violate the company’s home country law. 
However, in both instances, the company would be required to first make a 
reasonable attempt to clawback the incentive-based compensation.
76
 It must 
document its attempts to clawback the compensation and provide the 
documentation to the relevant exchange. The company would also be 
required to provide an explanation as to why it decided not to pursue the 
clawback. The decision not to pursue the clawback must be made by an 
independent remuneration committee of the company and such decision 
may be reviewed by the relevant exchange.
77
 
    These rules are clearly designed to prevent the circumvention of the 
Dodd-Frank clawback provisions in instances where company boards are 
afforded a wide discretion whether to recoup overpaid incentives. At the 
same time, they signify the SEC’s appreciation of the fact that seeking 
clawback in situations where the costs of recovery exceed the amount of 
erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation would generally not be 
in the interests of the company and its stakeholders.
78
 
 
3 4 8 Indemnity  and  directors’  insurance 
 
The proposed Rule 10D–1 would prohibit companies from indemnifying 
executive officers against the loss of erroneously awarded incentive-based 
compensation. Having considered that the clawback under section 10D of 
the SEC Act applies on a no-fault basis, the SEC came to the conclusion 
that indemnification arrangements would be undesirable as they would 
nullify the purpose of section 10D. 
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3 4 9 Disclosure 
 
In line with section 10D of the SEC Act, the proposed Rule 10D–1 would 
require a listed company to disclose its clawback policy as an exhibit to its 
annual report. If during the company’s preceding fiscal year, there was a 
restatement that triggered the clawback or there was an outstanding balance 
of excess incentive-based compensation from a prior restatement, then the 
company would need to disclose the following information:
79
 
 the date on which the restatement was required; 
 the total amount of excess incentive-based compensation attributable to 
the restatement; 
 the total amount of excess incentive-based compensation that is 
outstanding at the end of the company’s last completed fiscal year; and 
 the estimates used to determine the excess compensation in the case of 
compensation based on share price or total shareholder return. 
    Furthermore, if the issuer decided not to pursue recovery, then the name 
of each executive officer subject to recovery, the amount forgone and the 
reason for not to pursuing recovery must be provided. If the excess 
compensation has been outstanding for 180 days or longer, the name of the 
officer and the outstanding amount must be disclosed. These disclosure 
requirements are aimed at increasing transparency, thereby informing 
shareholders’ voting and investment decisions.
80
 It is also hoped that the 
disclosure would ensure compliance with the listing standards of the various 
stock exchanges.
81
 
 
4 CLAWBACK  REFORMS  IN  AUSTRALIA 
 
4 1 The  discussion  paper  on  clawbacks 
 
As is the case in the USA and UK, excessive and inappropriate 
remuneration practices have continued to raise considerable controversy in 
Australia. One of the responses of the Australian government to the 
community concerns against questionable executive bonuses and incentives 
was the introduction of the clawback proposal that was subsequently 
followed by the release of a clawback discussion paper in December 2010.
82
 
The essence of the proposed clawback proposal was that the directors and 
executives should be obliged to repay the company any remuneration paid 
to them based on the company’s financial statements that turn out to be 
materially misstated.
83
 This, according to the discussion paper, could be a 
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recoupment of remuneration already paid to the executive, or a cancellation 
of an outstanding but unvested and unpaid future award.
84
 The discussion 
paper posed, inter alia, the following key considerations in relation to the 
formulation of rules regarding the implementation of the clawback: 
 whether the clawback should be implemented through legislation, best 
practice principles, or a mixture of the two; 
 which companies should the clawback apply to; 
 which members of the executive board should it apply to; 
 what kind of event would trigger a clawback; 
 the determination of an appropriate amount of the clawback; 
 when the clawback amount would need to be repaid; 
 whether intention or misconduct should be considered in the clawback 
provision; 
 how far back should the clawback apply; and 
 who should bear the responsibility for applying the clawback? 
    There has been considerable debate concerning the desirability of 
legislating clawbacks in Australia. One of the major stakeholders who 
supported the clawback mechanism, the Australian Council of Super 
Investors (ACSI), argued that the clawback should be facilitated through 
appropriate changes to the Corporations Act of 2001.
85
 
    On the other hand, stakeholders such as the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD) strongly opposed the clawback reforms on the 
basis that they were totally unwarranted, would add red tape for little or no 
benefit and were likely to have unintended consequences on the structuring 
of remuneration.
86
 The AICD further argued that some companies already 
had included clawback provisions as part of their remuneration 
arrangements and that the appropriateness of particular forms of clawbacks 
would vary from company to company.
87
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    Other stakeholders, although not opposed to the principle that executives 
should not be allowed to retain the remuneration that was determined based 
on misleading financial information, objected to the idea that the clawback 
provision should be legislated in the Corporations Act of 2001. It has been 
observed that most of the submissions made to the discussion paper 
seemed to be against the idea that the clawback should be mandated in the 
legislation.
88
 Instead, the majority of the submissions suggested that 
company boards or the non-binding principles of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Governance Council should regulate the clawback.
89
 It was 
contended that legislation tends to be too rigid and only offers a one-size-
fits-all solution that may not be suitable for all companies.
90
 Furthermore, 
according to these submissions, the rules surrounding the application of the 
clawback posed by the discussion paper should not be prescribed.
91
 It has, 
therefore, been suggested that companies should bear the responsibility for 
applying the clawback and that they should be at liberty to design their own 
clawback policies and to determine the recoverable amounts under those 
policies. 
 
4 2 Corporations  Legislation  Amendment  Bill  2012 
(Remuneration  Disclosures  and  Other  Measures) 
 
The Australian Federal Government released for consultation the exposure 
draft of the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures 
and Other Measures) Bill 2012, which has not yet passed into legislation.
92
 
The draft Bill proposes to amend the Corporations Act 2001 by adding a new 
requirement at the end of section 300A(1). In terms of the proposed 
amendment, if a listed company becomes aware during the financial year of 
a material misstatement or omission in its financial statements for the 
previous 3 financial years, such company is required to report in its 
remuneration report for each of the key management personnel (KMP), the 
following information: 
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 the details of any reduction, repayment, or other alteration of the 
person’s remuneration made, or to be made, because of the 
misstatement or omission;
93
 or 
 if a reduction, repayment or alteration of the person’s remuneration has 
not been made, and will not be made – an explanation of why.
94
 
    Notably, the clawback provisions under the draft Bill would apply to all 
listed companies that become aware of material misstatements or omissions 
in their financial statements for the previous three financial years whether or 
not there was any misconduct involved. The clawback would be applied by 
the company. The company would be entitled to reduce or seek repayment 
or other alteration of the erroneously awarded remuneration. The disclosures 
are to be made in the company’s remuneration report. Thus in the event that 
shareholders are dissatisfied with the company’s actions, they would be able 
to vote against the remuneration report under the “two-strikes rule” and to 
potentially require that all the directors resign and stand for re-election within 
90 days.
95
 
    The clawback would apply to key management personnel of all listed 
companies. Section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 provides that the term 
“key management personnel” has the same meaning as in the accounting 
standards. In terms of Accounting Standard AASB 124.9, “key management 
personnel” refers to those persons having authority and responsibility for 
planning, directing and controlling the activities of the entity, directly or 
indirectly, including any director
96
 of that entity. Thus, the clawback would 
apply to a wide category of company officers. The draft Bill is, however, 
silent on whether the clawback would apply to former key management 
personnel as well. 
    Although the draft Bill proposes an approach on the clawback of executive 
remuneration that reflects the one adopted in the USA under section 10D of 
the SEC Act, as inserted by Dodd-Frank, discussed above, there are 
significant differences between the two approaches. The draft Bill has been 
crafted on an “if not, why not” basis. This is not the case with section 10D. 
The “if not, why not” approach proposed under the draft Bill affords the 
company a discretion whether to pursue a reduction, repayment or alteration 
of the erroneously awarded remuneration. It represents a realisation that in 
certain situations it could not be in the interests of the company and its 
stakeholders to apply the clawback. The requirement to provide reasons for 
not seeking a reduction, repayment or alteration of the remuneration would 
then serve to prevent the circumvention of the underlying purpose of the 
proposed clawback provisions. 
    Whereas section 10D of the SEC Act is triggered by a financial 
restatement, the draft Bill does not require a financial restatement. The 
requirement to disclose under the Bill is triggered when a listed company 
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becomes aware of a material misstatement or omission in its financial 
statements. 
    However, under both section 10D of the SEC and the draft Bill the 
clawback is triggered by financial metrics, that is, material misstatements in 
the financial statements and there is no provision for other potential triggers. 
This may be criticised on the ground that it restricts the circumstances in 
which erroneously awarded remuneration may be recovered since 
companies may use non-financial metrics to determine performance-based 
remuneration.
97
 
 
4 3 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations 
 
In response to the concerns that the draft Bill was intended to address, the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council
98
 issued a draft of the third edition of 
the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations in August 
2013
99
 which contained a proposal that listed companies should adopt 
clawback policies.
100
 According to Recommendation 8.3 of the Draft 
Principles and Recommendations, a listed entity should: 
 
“(a) have a clawback policy which sets out the circumstances in which the 
entity can clawback performance-based remuneration from its senior 
executives; 
 (b) disclose that policy or a summary of it; and 
 (c) disclose at the end of each reporting period: 
(1) whether any performance-based remuneration has been clawed back 
in accordance with the policy during the reporting period; and 
(2) where performance-based remuneration should have been clawed 
back in accordance with the policy but was not, the reasons for this.” 
 
    Although the Council has not yet adopted the above recommendation, it 
signifies the Council’s approach that clawbacks should be regulated within 
the framework of the Principles and Recommendations rather than in 
legislation.
101
 The recommendation reiterates the “if not, why not” 
mechanism underpinning the principles-based approach as opposed to a 
“one-size-fits-all” legislative approach. Under this approach, companies are 
not compelled to comply with the recommendations. A company is at liberty, 
subject to providing an explanation why, to disregard the recommendation if 
the recommendation does not suit its specific circumstances. In addition, the 
Draft Principles and Recommendations have not prescribed the 
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circumstances under which the companies can clawback performance-
based remuneration from the executives. This has been left to companies 
themselves to determine. 
 
5 CLAWBACKS  IN  THE  EU 
 
5 1 The  non-binding  principles-based  approach 
 
According to a statement issued by the European Corporate Governance 
Forum
102
 during the global financial crisis, the substance of director 
remuneration should not be regulated in a mandatory way at EU level.
103
 It is 
for companies and their shareholders to determine what pay structure, and 
levels are appropriate for their directors in light of their particular 
circumstances and different practices. The Forum stated that general best 
practices are evolving to ensure that the remuneration policy promotes the 
medium and long-term interests of the company rather than the short-term, 
that appropriate consideration should be given to the effects of incentive-
based pay on the risks of the company, that excessive remuneration is 
excluded and that as little scope as possible is given to manipulation. 
    The Forum believed that key elements of such best practices include 
clawbacks. The document stated as follows: 
 
“To the extent possible under applicable employment laws and companies’ 
legislation, the company should reserve the right, at the discretion of non-
executive directors, to reclaim performance linked remuneration elements 
which were paid to or vested on executive directors on the basis of results that 
afterwards were found to have been significantly misstated because of 
wrongdoing or malpractice (‘clawback’).”
104
 
 
    Further, the EC issued the 2009 Recommendations, which had to be 
implemented by the member states by the end of 2009.
105
 The 
Recommendations deal with the remuneration of executives of companies 
with a listing in the EU. More importantly, section II, 3.4, recommends that 
contractual arrangements with executive or managing directors should 
include provisions that permit the company to reclaim variable components 
of remuneration that were awarded on the basis of data which subsequently 
proved to be manifestly misstated.
106
 It has been accepted that the 2009 
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Recommendations are hard to argue with, even though they signify a 
significant tightening of the approach of the EC.
107
 
    Notably, the EC clawback recommendation does not require the presence 
of misconduct on the part of the company or the executives. The company 
should reclaim variable remuneration. Further, the EC clawback does not 
appear to be limited to only overpaid remuneration arising from misstated 
financial information, but would also apply to overpaid remuneration arising 
from errors in other metrics. The recommendation is, however, silent on the 
period during which the clawback should apply. 
    The EC clawback recommendation may be criticised on the ground that it 
is only limited to executive and managing directors. Moreover, the EU 
Recommendations are not binding. Member states have thus implemented 
the clawback recommendation as best practice under the codes of good 
governance as opposed to prescriptive legislative provisions. 
    In the UK, for example, clawbacks have been implemented via the non-
binding recommendations of the 2014 UK Corporate Governance Code,
108
 
formerly the Combined Code on Corporate Governance.
109
 The UK Code 
recommends that performance-related remuneration schemes for executive 
directors should include provisions that would enable the company to 
recover sums paid or withhold the payment of any sum and specify the 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so.
110
 
    Although the UK Code provides for the adoption of clawback policies, 
there are no binding legal requirements in this regard.
111
 Further, it is left to 
the discretion of company boards to determine the circumstances in which 
                                                          
107
 Ferarini, Moloney and Ungureanu “Executive remuneration in crisis: a critical assessment of 
reforms in Europe” 2010 10(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 73 116. 
108
 Financial Reporting Council “The UK Corporate Governance Code” 2014 D1.1.1 2014 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-2014.pdf (accessed 2016-10-01). Hereinafter “the UK Code”. 
109
 Notably, in a referendum held in June 2016 51.9% of the UK’s citizens voted in favour of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU. However, the UK has not yet invoked the process set out in 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union for the formal withdrawal of a country from the 
EU. This means that the UK still remains a member of the EU until it invokes Article 50. The 
issue of clawbacks in the UK was first highlighted by the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee (“the Committee”) in its ninth report of session 2008-2009. The Committee had 
concluded that the use of mechanisms such as the clawing back of bonus payments from 
senior and board level staff should be encouraged to align the interests of senior staff more 
closely with those of shareholders. The Committee called for a more widespread use of 
such mechanisms particularly within the financial sector as this would, in the Committees 
opinion; help discourage excessive risk-taking and short-termism. See House of Commons 
Treasury Committee “Banking Crisis: reforming corporate governance and pay in the City” 
(Ninth Report of Session 2008–09) 2009 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 
200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/519/519.pdf (accessed 2016-10-01) 24. 
110
 Financial Reporting Council https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Gover 
nance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf. The Code further recommends that 
remuneration incentives for executive directors should be compatible with risk policies and 
systems. See Schedule A to the UK Code. 
111
 The UK Code operates on a principles-based “comply or explain” basis, allowing companies 
the flexibility to disregard its recommendations in order to suit their individual circumstances 
on condition that the reasons for non-compliance should be explained to shareholders. See 
Financial Reporting Council https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Gover 
nance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf 4. 
66 OBITER 2018 
 
 
clawbacks would apply. This marks a sharp difference with the USA and the 
Netherlands (discussed below) where such policies are mandated by 
legislation. 
    It has been observed that clawbacks may raise considerable challenges 
that will need to be carefully considered in many countries within the EU.
112
 
For example, requiring executives to pay back the remuneration that has 
already been paid could potentially breach the existing labour laws in some 
EU countries like France and Germany.
113
 The tax implications of the 
clawback will also need to be considered and clarified across the EU 
jurisdictions.
114
 
 
5 2 Mandated  clawbacks  in  the  Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands has passed legislation which makes it possible for open 
corporations (public limited companies), whether listed or not, to clawback 
directors’ bonuses if they have been paid based on incorrect information. 
Article 2:135(8) of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the company: 
 
“[I]s entitled to recover a bonus in full or in part to the extent that payment 
thereof has been made on the basis of incorrect information about the 
realization of the underlying goals or about the circumstances from which the 
entitlement to the bonus was made dependant.”
115
 
 
    Every public company has thus been given the power to seek recovery of 
the erroneously awarded bonuses. The recovery claim may also be filed in 
the name of the company by the supervisory board (in the case of a two-tier 
board), the non-executive directors of a one-tier board, or by a special 
representative appointed by the general meeting of shareholders for this 
purpose.
116
 
    Unlike the equivalent provisions in the USA and the draft Bill in Australia 
which require a material misstatement in the company’s financial 
statements, article 2:135(8) of the Dutch Civil Code is not prescriptive of the 
potential triggers of the clawback and does not narrowly confine the 
clawback to situations where there are financial misstatements. On the 
contrary, the clawback will be possible in situations where incorrect 
information about the realisation of the underlying goals or about the 
circumstances on which the entitlement to the bonus was made dependant. 
Arguably, such situations may include, but are not limited to, misstatements 
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in the financial statements and mismeasurement of other performance 
criteria. This could be a realisation on the part of the Dutch legislature that 
remuneration incentives may be determined not only in the light of financial 
performance metrics but also in the light of non-financial performance 
metrics like risk management and other circumstances significant to the 
company as well. 
    In contrast to the SEC Act in the USA and the draft Bill in Australia, article 
2:135(8) of the Dutch Civil Code does not specify the period during which 
the clawback should apply. This is similar to the approach under the EC 
Recommendation and the UK Combined Code, which are also silent on how 
far back the clawback would apply. Due to the presumed reluctance of 
directors to actively seek recovery of overpaid remuneration from current or 
former directors and executives, article 2:135(8) gives the supervisory board, 
the non-executive directors or a special representative appointed by the 
general meeting the power to file a clawback claim on behalf of the 
company. 
    The clawback under article 2:135(8) may, however, be criticised on the 
ground that it only applies to directors and does not apply to certain key 
executives of public companies. Furthermore, the provision does not require 
the company to recover unearned or overpaid bonuses. It simply provides 
that the company is entitled to recover such bonuses. It, therefore, gives the 
board an unfettered discretion whether to clawback the bonuses. 
 
6 CLAWBACK  POLICIES  VOLUNTARILY  ADOPTED 
BY  COMPANIES 
 
Companies in various jurisdictions have voluntarily adopted clawback 
policies and specified the circumstances in which overpaid remuneration 
incentives will be clawed back.
117
 These policies are, however, unlikely to be 
effective in addressing the problem of excess incentives since they may not 
be enforceable. For instance, studies conducted in the USA revealed that 
before the enactment of Dodd-Frank the majority of the S&P 500 companies 
did not adopt robust clawback policies requiring the companies to recover 
overpaid remuneration from the executives.
118
 The policies that existed 
simply gave the directors the discretion to recover overpaid remuneration 
from executives.
119
 It is, however, difficult to rely on directors to voluntarily 
recoup overpaid remuneration from fellow directors and from the executives. 
This is so because the directors will presumably be reluctant to actively seek 
repayment of overpaid remuneration form other directors or former directors 
and executives due to certain social, economic and psychological 
considerations.
120
 Such factors include considerations of loyalty amongst the 
directors and executives concerned as well as the desire to maintain good 
relations with departing and departed directors or executives.
121
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7 A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The above discussion has examined the need for the clawing back of 
overpaid remuneration, the rationale for clawback reforms as well as the 
approaches adopted in selected international jurisdictions that have 
implemented clawback reforms. It is, however, clear from the discussion 
above that clawbacks pose a number of practical problems in 
implementation, which need to be carefully thought out. The author 
considers here whether a remuneration clawback would be appropriate in 
South Africa and, if so, how it could be implemented, based on the lessons 
learnt from an examination of the approaches adopted by its international 
counterparts. 
 
7 1 Should clawbacks be introduced in South Africa? 
 
In South Africa, the remuneration of company directors and prescribed 
officers is regulated under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as well as under 
market-based regulatory instruments such as the King IV Report on 
Governance for South Africa 2016
122
 and the listings requirements of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
123
 Although the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
contains provisions related to the disclosure of remuneration of directors and 
prescribed officers, it does not provide for the recovery or clawing back of 
overstated incentives or other remuneration. Similarly, the JSE Listings 
Requirements are silent on the issue of remuneration clawback. In a positive 
step, the King IV Report, which came into effect on 1 April 2017, has 
introduced a new recommendation that companies should adopt 
remuneration policies which should set out inter alia “the provisions (if any) 
for pre-vesting forfeiture (malus) and post-vesting forfeiture (clawback) of 
remuneration.
124
 Unfortunately, the non-binding principles of the King IV 
Report are silent on the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for 
companies to clawback the remuneration. The King IV Report has also left 
the adoption of clawback provisions to the discretion of companies. The 
absence of a requirement for the clawback of remuneration in South Africa 
would, therefore, mean that shareholders would have to institute legal 
proceedings in order to recover the erroneously awarded amounts. As 
already pointed out, clawback litigation may be protracted and costly for 
shareholders.
125
 
    Furthermore, South African companies are increasingly adopting the US, 
UK and Australian type remuneration structures with a strong emphasis on 
the payment of performance-based incentives.
126
 A recent study conducted 
by Massie, Collier and Crotty has revealed that in most of South Africa’s big 
companies, bonuses and share-based incentives constitute a substantial 
portion of the remuneration packages awarded to executives.
127
 The 
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developments that preceded clawback reforms in the US, EU and Australia 
have already highlighted the danger of incentive-based remuneration, 
including the remuneration structures that are designed to encourage short-
term behaviour to the potential detriment of the long-term value of 
companies. 
    In addition, as discussed above, mismeasurement of performance metrics 
for determining incentive-based remuneration will potentially undermine the 
pay-performance link and its attendant advantages.
128
 Therefore, there is a 
need for appropriate regulation in order to address the dangers associated 
with the prevalent remuneration structures and to ensure that performance 
incentives are properly aligned with the company’s long-term value. 
Introducing clawbacks would be one way of achieving these imperatives. In 
my view, the rationale for the clawback of overpaid incentive-based 
remuneration in the international jurisdictions is equally relevant to the South 
African market. 
 
7 2 The  form  of  the  clawback 
 
It is clear from the discussion above that there are four ways in which a 
clawback may be implemented. The first is through legislation. The second 
is through the rules of stock exchanges. The third is through the non-binding 
codes of best practice. The fourth is through policies voluntarily adopted by 
companies. Therefore, South Africa has an option to introduce the 
clawbacks via the Companies Act 71 of 2008, or the JSE Listings 
Requirements, or the King Reports, or voluntary policies adopted by 
companies themselves. If the clawback is regulated through the JSE Listings 
Requirements, it would only apply to companies whose securities are listed 
on the JSE. The major drawback of introducing the clawback through the 
recommendations of the King Reports such as the King IV Report is that as 
a market-based code of best practice the principles of the King IV Report are 
not binding on non-listed companies. The implementation of a clawback 
recommendation under the King IV Report would, therefore, predominantly 
depend on the directors’ discretion yet, as discussed above, the directors 
would generally be reluctant to actively seek recovery of overpaid 
remuneration from fellow directors and executives.
129
 Similarly, the 
effectiveness of voluntary clawback policies adopted by companies is 
questionable. The major flaws of such policies include that they may not be 
sufficiently robust and that there is no obligation on all companies to have 
these policies in place.
130
 
    The author, therefore, suggests that the clawback should be enshrined in 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This is because the provisions of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 are mandatory and the provision could be framed 
in such a manner that it applies to a wide category of companies (as 
discussed below). This would be in line with the approach in the USA and 
the Netherlands as well as that proposed in Australia, of implementing the 
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clawback via legislation. I further propose that the introduction of a clawback 
in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 should not bar the regulation of clawbacks 
through the JSE Listings Requirements and the King IV Report provided that 
these latter methods do not conflict with the statutory provision. 
 
7 3 The  companies  that  should  be  subject  to  the 
clawback 
 
The approaches adopted by the international jurisdictions discussed above 
appear to be in support of the view that there should generally be a 
widespread use of clawbacks. For instance, the clawback under section 10D 
of the SEC Act applies to all companies listed in the USA regardless of size 
and of the categories of securities issued by the company. The clawback 
provision proposed in Australia would also apply to all companies listed in 
Australia and no category of the company has been exempted from 
complying with the proposed requirements. The Netherlands goes even 
further than Australia and the USA, as the clawback under article 2:135(8) of 
the Dutch Civil Code applies to all public companies, whether listed or not. It 
is submitted that the developments are a manifestation of a realisation that 
the policy objectives of clawing back overpaid remuneration (discussed 
above) are relevant for a wide category of companies, including those which 
could be regarded as relatively small companies. However, it has been 
pointed out that regulators should be careful not to unduly burden smaller 
companies with compliance issues relating to remuneration clawbacks as 
well as companies that are unlikely to derive any economic benefits from the 
clawback requirements.
131
 
    The author, therefore, proposes that companies in South Africa that 
should be subject to the clawback provision are companies that are currently 
required to disclose information on the remuneration of directors and 
prescribed officers in their annual financial statements. These are 
companies that are required in terms of the Companies Act, 2008, to have 
their annual financial statements audited,
132
 namely public companies, state-
owned companies as well as any other profit or non-profit company, the 
annual financial statements of which must be audited if so required by the 
regulations made by the Minister in terms of section 30(7), taking into 
account whether it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to the 
economic or social significance of the company, as indicated by any relevant 
factors, including its annual turnover, the size of its workforce, or the nature 
and extent of its activities.
133
 In my view, these are relatively big companies 
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in terms of their social significance and the stakeholders of these 
companies, including the South African market, would benefit from the 
introduction of a clawback requirement. 
 
7 4 Persons  to  whom  the  clawback  should  apply 
 
The approach followed under SOX, the EU Recommendations, the UK Code 
and the Dutch Civil Code may be criticised for entitling the company to 
recover overpaid remuneration from only a very limited category of 
individuals.
134
 It excludes a number of officers who play an influential role in 
the management of companies from the ambit of the clawback provisions 
and would restrict the effectiveness of the clawback provisions in practice. 
Accordingly, I suggest that the clawback provision in South Africa should 
apply to directors and prescribed officers of the company, including former 
directors and prescribed officers of the company who would have received 
overpaid remuneration in the period over which the clawback applied. This 
would be consistent with section 10D of the SEC Act that has extended the 
application of the clawback provision to any current or former executive 
officer of the company (as defined) who received incentive-based 
compensation during the preceding three-year period. It would also be 
consistent with the clawback proposed in Australia by the draft Bill that 
would apply to all key management personnel (as defined) of all listed 
companies. The difference would be that the draft Bill is silent on whether 
the clawback would apply to former key management personnel as well. 
    In the author’s view, concerns relating to the practicality of applying the 
clawback provision to South African prescribed officers could be ameliorated 
by giving the board of directors the necessary, albeit limited, discretion to 
invoke the clawback provision. Such discretion should be subject to 
necessary safeguards such as the requirement that the board genuinely 
believes that the recovery would not be in the best interests of the company 
and appropriate disclosure requirements. In addition, applying the clawback 
to current and former directors and prescribed officers would be in line with 
the current section 30(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which provides 
for the disclosure of information in relation to directors’ and prescribed 
officers’ remuneration, including that of former directors and prescribed 
officers. The purpose of extending the clawback to former directors and 
prescribed officers would be to prevent the directors and prescribed officers 
from circumventing the clawback by simply resigning. 
 
7 5 Potential  triggers  of  the  clawback 
 
It is recommended that, in order to avoid undesirable legislative rigidity, 
South Africa should adopt the approach similar to that under article 2:135(8) 
of the Dutch Civil Code, which is not prescriptive of the potential triggers of 
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the clawback. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 should, in this regard, contain 
a provision requiring companies to recover incentive-based remuneration to 
the extent that the awarding, vesting or payment of such remuneration has 
been made on the basis of incorrect information about the realisation of the 
underlying goals or about the circumstances from which the entitlement to 
the remuneration was made dependant. Such an approach would differ from 
that in the USA and that proposed for Australia where clawbacks are 
triggered only by financial misstatements. 
    Focusing solely on financial metrics would restrict the operation of 
clawbacks since companies may use a wide variety of metrics, events, or 
circumstances relevant to each company – including non-financial ones – to 
determine performance-based remuneration. Therefore, the reach of the 
clawback provisions should be broad enough to cover financial performance 
metrics, non-financial performance metrics, as well as other circumstances 
in order to be effective. This suggested approach would also be in line with 
section II, 3.4 of the EU Recommendation in terms of which, as discussed 
above, the clawback would be triggered by data, which subsequently proved 
to be manifestly misstated. The term “data” would presumably cover financial 
as well as non-financial information. 
 
7 6 Wrongdoing 
 
The author proposes that the existence of wrongdoing
135
 should be 
disregarded when considering whether to apply the clawback. This would be 
in line with the clawbacks under section 10D of the SEC Act, the proposed 
SEC Rule 10D–1, the EESA, the EU Clawback Recommendation, the UK 
Code, the Dutch Civil Code, as well as the draft Bill and the Draft Principles 
and Recommendations in Australia. In terms of all the above regulatory 
instruments, the clawbacks could be invoked regardless of whether or not 
there was wrongdoing on the part of the company or the individuals 
concerned. It is evident from these regulatory instruments that the clawing 
back of overpaid remuneration should be regarded an equitable remedy 
against unjust enrichment. A requirement for wrongdoing would, in my view, 
be superfluous as overpaid remuneration may result even in the absence of 
wrongdoing. The requirement for wrongdoing could, as already pointed out, 
potentially lead to costly litigation, and would undermine the effectiveness of 
the clawback provision in promoting accountability and preventing unjust 
enrichment.
136
 
 
7 7 The  clawback  period 
 
The legislation should specify the time period over which the clawback 
should be applied in order to promote certainty and enforceability. As 
discussed above, in the USA, the Dodd-Frank clawback prescribes a “look 
back” period of three preceding fiscal years from the date the company is 
required to prepare an accounting restatement and this is longer than the 
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twelve-month period prescribed in the earlier SOX. A similar approach has 
been proposed in Australia. Later regulatory instruments such as the UK 
Code and the Dutch Civil Code are silent on how far back the clawback 
should apply. Although the clawback period should ideally be extended 
enough to cover all possible overpaid incentives in order to be effective,
137
 
an extraordinarily long or an unspecified period may raise difficulties with 
enforcement. There will likely be huge practical challenges in seeking 
recovery, as noted by the Australian government, where longer periods of 
say twenty years have lapsed since the occurrence of the triggering event.
138
 
 
7 8 The  responsibility  for  applying  the  clawback 
 
The author recommends that the Companies Act 71 of 2008 should require 
the company to clawback the erroneously awarded remuneration from its 
present or former directors or prescribed officers. This would help remove 
the burden on shareholders to litigate clawback claims. The developments in 
the USA have also shown that placing the onus on bodies such as stock 
exchanges would not lead to optimum outcomes.
139
 
    In order to avoid the rigidity often associated with legislation evident from 
the USA’s approach under section 10D of the SEC Act, an approach akin to 
the “if not, why not” approach proposed for Australia should be adopted in 
South Africa. Under this approach, the company should be required to seek 
recovery of the erroneously awarded remuneration except where the 
company provides an explanation as to why recovery could not be sought. 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 should, in this regard, provide for limited 
circumstances in which a company would be permitted not to seek recovery. 
I suggest, in line with Rule 10–D in the USA, that the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 should permit a company not to seek recovery where recovery would 
be impracticable or where the recovery costs would be greater than the 
recoverable amount. Further, the board must genuinely believe that it is in 
the best interests of the company not to seek recovery. 
    The approach suggested would arguably prevent the circumvention of the 
clawback provisions through limiting the board’s discretion whether to seek 
recovery of the erroneously awarded remuneration. At the same time, it 
would allow for the flexibility needed to cater for a situation where seeking 
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recovery would not be practical, would not lead to any economic benefits 
accruing to the company and would genuinely not be in the interests of the 
company. 
 
7 9 The  determination  of  the  clawback  amount 
 
The board should determine the recoverable amount within a reasonable 
period following the event that triggered the clawback. However, the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 should provide guidance on how the amount is to 
be determined in order to assist company boards in this regard. The tax 
implications of the clawback should also be clarified in the legislation. Once 
the board has determined the recoverable amount, the company should be 
required to clawback the remuneration from the individuals concerned within 
a reasonable period of time. 
 
7 10 Indemnification  of  directors 
 
In line with Rule 10D–1 in the USA, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 should 
not allow companies to indemnify – directly or indirectly – directors and 
executives against the recovery of the erroneously awarded remuneration. 
Providing indemnity to directors would enable directors and executives to 
retain the unearned or overpaid remuneration and would negate the 
underlying purposes of the clawback provision discussed above. 
 
7 11 Disclosure 
 
It is recommended that the Companies Act 71 of 2008 should require 
companies to disclose their clawback policies. Companies should also be 
required to disclose information in relation to compliance with the clawback 
policies. This would be in line with Rule 10D–1 in the USA and the draft Bill 
in Australia. Requiring companies to disclose their clawback policies and 
how the policies have been implemented would promote greater 
transparency and also exert pressure on companies to comply with the 
clawback requirements. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa’s remuneration practice follows UK, USA and Australian 
practice that has a strong emphasis on the payment of bonuses and the use 
of share-based incentives. The corporate scandals and the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 have highlighted the danger of executives managing 
companies in pursuit of short-term performance-based incentives at the 
expense of long-term value. The clawing back of incentive-based 
remuneration paid to certain directors and executives seeks to promote 
responsible management of companies, long-term sustainability of 
companies, transparency, and accountability for inappropriate behaviour. It 
also seeks to prevent the manipulation of data, the diversion of corporate 
funds and unjust enrichment. 
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    The article has examined the clawback reforms in the USA, Australia, the 
UK, the EU and the Netherlands. It has identified and analysed the potential 
benefits and shortcomings of the regulatory reforms in each jurisdiction. It 
has paid particular focus on the form of the clawback; the categories of 
companies that should be subject to the clawback; the range of persons to 
whom the clawback should apply; the potential triggers of the clawback; the 
time period over which the clawback should apply; the amount recoverable; 
the responsibility for applying the clawback; indemnification of directors as 
well as disclosure of the clawback policy and details of implementation. It is 
clear from the discussion above that clawbacks posing a number of practical 
problems in implementation, which need to be carefully thought out. 
    The South African regulatory framework in relation to the director and 
executive remuneration does not provide for remuneration clawbacks. The 
absence of a requirement for the clawback of remuneration means that 
shareholders will have to embark on costly legal proceedings in order to 
recover the amounts erroneously awarded. South Africa’s regulatory 
framework in relation to the director and executive remuneration should be 
strengthened and modernised in order to keep pace with changing 
regulatory challenges. It is, therefore, recommended that South Africa 
should adopt and regulate the clawback of incentive-based remuneration in 
the Companies Act, 2008. The introduction of a clawback in this Act should, 
however, not bar the regulation of clawbacks through the JSE Listings 
Requirements and the King Reports provided that these latter methods do 
not conflict with the statutory provision. A robust framework for the regulation 
of clawbacks in a manner that allows for greater transparency and 
accountability, as recommended above, would be in line with the objectives 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as set out in section 7(b)(iii) and (j). 
